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Techniques are described herein to provide a centralized policy management 
mechanism that enables: the consumption of traffic intent from the well-known CNC; 
translation into new rule sets dynamically applied along the path; and the dynamic 
monitoring of the CNC rule sets for dynamic adaptation of rules as the traffic intent changes. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The IEEE 802.1 standard series defines Time Sensitive Networking (TSN) for 
communications of latency sensitive applications. These applications are used in 
manufacturing, utilities, and many other industries. One of the TSN sub-standards is IEEE 
802.1Qci, which defines policing and filtering on ingress ports to protect time-sensitive 
flows. This is an important security addition to TSN because it ensures protection against 
excessive bandwidth usage, burst sizes, and incorrectly configured or malicious endpoints. 
802.1Qci can be further used as a mechanism to isolate faults to specific regions of the 
network, thus limiting the impact to other parts of the network. 
Although 802.1Qci is a published standard that defines the protection of TSN flows 
in a shared Ethernet network, little progress has been made to connect the standard with 
existing industrial security systems and architectures. The 802.1Qci approach is network-
element-centric, and focused on buffer efficiency. Furthermore, very little has been 
explored about how 802.1Qci policies could be deployed on network devices and merged 
with existing industrial security policies on those devices. 
The 802.1Qci standard is relatively new and does not define how specific policies 
are created and deployed.  In addition, 802.1Qci limits its scope to defining how a network 
element (e.g., switch) reads incoming traffic, compares the entering flow to traffic 
importance labels, and applies possible filtering to avoid unidentified or low importance 
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traffic to delay more important traffic. However, the 802.1Qci standard does not define 
how these filtering rules appear or are dynamically updated at the scale of the network.  
Techniques disclosed herein fill that gap, with methods to deploy intent-based, per-
flow 802.1Qci firewall rules on TSN bridges. These techniques integrate the security of 
802.1Qci TSN flows with a generalized security architecture in industrial networks, 
effectively allowing industrial switches that implement 802.1Qci to also de facto become 
industrial firewalls. 
TSN networks following a centralized configuration model employ a Central User 
Configuration (CUC) that defines the overall business intent of each TSN application. The 
CUC, in turn, communicates with a Central Network Controller (CNC) that acts as a proxy 
and network configuration component for the TSN bridges and their endpoint connections. 
Through a restful API, the CNC learns all TSN flow information from the CUC, including 
sending entity or target entity MAC addresses and the application latency requirements of 
the flow. With this information, the CNC is able to discover the intended network path for 
all present flows, and program the appropriate flow schedule into all TSN bridges. 
According to 802.1Qci, the CNC does not create or configure the security policies 
or firewall rules.  Instead it only describes bridge configurations that allow shaper 
mechanism and schedules.  This is because security on TSN bridges/switches encompasses 
more than just the TSN flows. 
To configure and deploy security policy rules based on 802.1Qci, a centralized view 
of security is proposed. Examples of a centralized policy server may include identity 
servers, an SCL configuration system (for utility), or an OPC configuration instance (in 
manufacturing environments). With reference to Figure 1, the proposed method functions 
as follows: 
1. To centralize the security policy, a connection is made from the Policy Server 
to the CNC. The identification and profiles (business intent) of TSN endpoints 
are imported as managed objects. Further, the TSN network communication 
paths defined by the CNC are imported as abstracted security zones and 
conduits. 
2. The security policy server owns the global security policies for the whole 
network. These policies are typically translated into specific configurations, 
3
Defensive Publications Series, Art. 1541 [2018]
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/1541
 3 5696 
which are then provisioned on the networking devices. These existing policies 
are required to merge with the dynamic 802.1Qci TSN security policies. Both 
are translated into switch-specific configurations and are deployed accordingly. 




3. The switches are expected to have existing security rules (e.g., DAI, MAC 
filtering, ingress ACL rules, etc.), based on the industrial network security 
policy. The Policy Server dynamically adds or removes the dynamic 802.1Qci 
rules from the switches as the CNC creates a path with specific bandwidth 
requirements through the network.  In addition, the Policy Server correlates and 
harmonizes the 802.1 Qci filtering and policing rules with the existing rules in 
order to create a consistent security mechanism. As a result, the Policy Server 
acts as a dynamic firewall rule generator on the TSN switches to ensure that the 
TSN flows are protected and that any misconfiguration does not expose the 
TSN endpoints to random parts of the network. 
4. Furthermore, as new TSN flows are added, the QoS configuration on the 
switches would need modification. The CNC is responsible for per-flow 
shapers, but the remainder of the QoS policy/configuration is adapted as more 
TSN flows are present. TSN flows always supersede other flows, thus reducing 
the available bandwidth on the port. The Policy Server also adjusts the QoS 
4
Barton et al.: Management of IEEE 802.1Qci Security Policies for Time Sensitive
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2018
 4 5696 
configuration with respect to queue and buffer sizes, in relation to the number 
of TSN flows that are present. This happens automatically (based on intent and 
context) and immediately. No manual configuration is needed. 
5. The Policy Server either configures the switches directly, or communicates with 
an orchestration server, which provisions the full security configuration to the 
switches and TSN bridges. 
A policy engine/server holds policies that associate objects to authentication or 
authorization profiles. In addition, a policy server according to the present proposal 
consumes the configuration of the automation system from a well-defined component, the 
TSN CNC. This component does not express security policies, but rather the traffic intent 
between the latency-sensitive endpoints. 
The policy server combines and correlates the information (intent and context) 
retrieved from 802.1Qci traffic intent files, to create a consistent and comprehensive policy 
along the intended path. Furthermore, the policy server monitors the files present in these 
CNC components to dynamically absorb and parse new file versions and to adapt the 
corresponding policy to any change in the configuration of the automation system, such as 
changed stream definitions or intent patterns. In other words, any new flows or changes in 
existing stream definition are immediately addressed in the policy server through a new 
comprehensive policy that is then deployed to the switches. This tight integration not only 
allows the policy server to configure DAI, ACL and other mechanisms dynamically, but 
also to establish stream filtering and input gating based on 802.1Qci in order to achieve a 
robust and comprehensive security architecture. 
The techniques disclosed herein enable the consumption of traffic intent from the 
well-known CNC, translation into new rulesets dynamically applied along the path, and 
the dynamic monitoring of the CNC rule sets for dynamic adaptation of rules as the traffic 
intent changes. 
These techniques extend and expand concepts from one domain to another, and 
involve using the per-flow definitions that reside in the CNC and consolidating them with 
other security and QoS rules that are already owned by the policy server. As a result, the 
policy server not only includes the existing rules, but also creates new rules for the TSN 
flows dynamically generated by the CNC. To accomplish these functions, the policy server 
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needs to understand the ranking and prioritization of the TSN flows and constructs a rule 
set that permits TSN flows and prevents other non-TSN traffic that attempts to 
communicate with the TSN endpoints. In effect, the dynamic 802.1Qci flows are used to 
create a QoS-aware TSN firewall. 
The proposed techniques employ a centralized policy server that consolidates the 
per-flow security policy via 802.1Qci with the network-wide security policy and then 
deploys and manages the policies on the switches. To provision these policy rules, the 
policy server can communicate back the consolidated rule set to a provisioning tool, such 
as the CNC. According to the proposed techniques, the policy server, as an authorization 
tool, is to consume TSN-specific data and returns rules that become significant for the 
security of the TSN flows. 
In summary, techniques are described herein provide a centralized policy 
management.  A policy server is configured to combine and correlate the intent and context 
information retrieved from 802.1Qci traffic intent files, and to create a consistent and 
comprehensive policy along the intended path. The policy server is further configured to 
monitor the files present in these CNC components to dynamically absorb and parse new 
file versions and to adapt the corresponding policy to any change in the configuration of 
the automation system. 
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